Bogoroch & Associates LLP, on behalf of the Appellant, Flordeliza Marcelo, was successful in the Divisional Court decision of Marcelo v. The Personal Insurance Company, 2026 ONSC 974, on the important issue of whether an intracranial brain contusion falls within the definition of a “minor injury” under Section 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, O. Reg. 34/10 (the “SABS”).
The Divisional Court found that the Licence Appeal Tribunal (“LAT”) erred in law in its interpretation of the definition of “minor injury.” The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the LAT’s decisions, and ordered that Ms. Marcelo’s intracranial brain contusion is not a minor injury, thereby removing her from the Minor Injury Guideline (“MIG”) and restoring her entitlement to accident benefits.
Background
The Appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on August 29, 2019. A CT scan performed on the date of the accident confirmed that she sustained a left frontal intracranial cerebral brain contusion.
The Personal Insurance Company determined that her injury fell within the definition of “minor injury” pursuant to Section 3(1) of the SABS and placed her within the MIG, thereby limiting her medical and rehabilitation benefits to $3,500.00.
The Appellant disputed her placement in the MIG at the LAT. In a preliminary issue decision dated November 21, 2024, the LAT concluded that the definition of “minor injury” includes a “contusion,” and that this term encompasses all types of contusions, including brain contusions.
The Appellant sought a reconsideration, but the decision was upheld on July 9, 2025.
She appealed to the Divisional Court on a question of law.
The Law
The Court began by setting out the relevant statutory framework. Section 3(1) of the SABS defines a “minor injury” as one or more of a sprain, strain, whiplash associated disorder, contusion, abrasion, laceration or subluxation and includes any clinically associated sequelae to such an injury.
In addressing the interpretive issue before it, the Court reaffirmed the “modern” principle of statutory interpretation which requires that statutory provisions be interpreted in light of their text, context, and purpose.
The Court further emphasized that the SABS is remedial, consumer-protective legislation designed to reduce economic hardship and dislocation suffered by motor vehicle accident victims. In that regard, it referred to Section 64(1) of the Legislation Act, 2006, which further requires that such legislation be given a fair, large, and liberal interpretation to best ensure attainment of its objects.
The Divisional Court’s Analysis
The Court held that the Tribunal committed an error of law by focusing on the degree of impairment rather than the nature of the injury. Section 3(1) uses the term “minor injury,” not “minor impairment,” and is therefore injury-based in its definition. This stands in contrast to the catastrophic impairment provisions of the SABS, which are expressly impairment-focused.
The proper interpretive question was whether an intracranial brain contusion is the type of injury contemplated by the MIG framework. Had the Tribunal asked that question, the Court concluded, the answer would have been no.
The Court undertook a contextual analysis of the MIG regime and found it structurally incompatible with brain trauma. The MIG imposes a $3,500 cap on treatment and is built around a 12-week functional restoration model designed primarily for musculoskeletal injuries. It permits limited diagnostic imaging, largely confined to X-rays; yet, brain contusions cannot be diagnosed through X-ray and may require neuropsychological assessment well in excess of the MIG cap. The recommended interventions within the MIG, such as exercise and manual therapy, may be appropriate for sprains and strains, but are wholly incompatible with neurological injury.
The Court also emphasized the statutory context. Section 3.1 of the SABS recognizes that intracranial contusions may satisfy the criteria for catastrophic impairment in certain circumstances. It would be illogical for an injury capable of grounding a catastrophic designation to simultaneously be classified as “minor.” This contextual inconsistency further supported the Court’s conclusion that the term “contusion” in the definition of minor injury under Section 3(1) was not intended to capture intracranial brain trauma.
Remedy
The Court determined that remitting the matter back to the LAT would serve no useful purpose, as the outcome was inevitable. The appeal was allowed, both LAT decisions were set aside, and the Court ordered that the Appellant be removed from the MIG and entitled to the benefits available to her at the time she was improperly placed within it. The five-year statutory limitation was preserved, and costs were fixed in the amount of $8,000.
Significance
Marcelo is an important Divisional Court authority confirming that the definition of “minor injury” under Section 3(1) of the SABS is injury-based, not impairment-based. The decision reinforces the consumer-protection purpose of the SABS, and clarifies that the MIG was designed for minor musculoskeletal injuries, not objectively verifiable brain trauma.
The ruling provides strong appellate guidance in MIG disputes involving imaging-confirmed intracranial pathology and limits the scope of broad literal interpretations of the term “contusion.”
Beyond the specific context of brain contusions, the decision stands as a clear reaffirmation that administrative decision-makers such as the LAT are bound by the modern principles of statutory interpretation. The SABS is a structured and purposive regime. Its provisions must be read coherently and harmoniously within that broader framework, not through a narrow focus on a single word that may lend itself to a more convenient interpretation that remains detached from context, structure, purpose, and its overarching consumer protection function.